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Two experiments explored the hypothesis that the impact of acti-
vating gender stereotypes on negotiated agreements in mixed-
gender negotiations depends on the manner in which the stereo-
type is activated (explicitly vs. implicitly) and the content of the
stereotype (linking negotiation performance to stereotypically
male vs. stereotypically female traits). Specifically, two experi-
ments investigated the generality and limits of stereotype
reactance. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that negotiated
outcomes become more one-sided in favor of the high power nego-
tiator when masculine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator
effectiveness. In contrast, the results of Experiment 2 suggest
that negotiated outcomes are more integrative (win-win) when
feminine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In
total, performance in mixed-gender negotiations is strongly
affected by the cognitions and motivations that negotiators bring
to the bargaining table.
Keywords: stereotype; gender; negotiations; reactance; threat; power
The current zeitgeist is one of political correctness,
which touts equality between various races, genders,
ages, and sexual orientations. Individuals and institu-
tions that are insensitive to this cultural movement are
subject to negative consequences, ranging from ostra-
cism and scorn to potential litigation. Although it has
been well documented that people are affected by cul-
tural stereotypes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald
et al., 2002), the spirit of political correctness mandates
that discussion of the content of these stereotypes
remains muted. Explicit acknowledgements of gender
differences stand out saliently against the background of
social correctness. Given this cultural climate, an inter-
esting question to consider is how the explicit linkage of
gender to ability affects the thoughts, motivations, and
behaviors of individuals.
In this article, we build on previous research that doc-
umented the ironic effects of explicitly and blatantly
linking gender to negotiation ability (Kray, Thompson,
& Galinsky, 2001). In general, when individuals perceive
a threat to their freedom, they tend to react against it by
exerting their freedom more forcefully than they other-
wise would (Brehm, 1966). In the negotiation domain,
this reactance process has been shown to occur through
the activation of negative gender stereotypes. Specifi-
cally, Kray et al. (2001) found that informing negotiators
that stereotypically masculine traits predict perfor-
mance at the bargaining table and that these traits differ
by gender led to a counterintuitive outcome: Female
negotiators outperformed their male counterparts.
Thus, instead of confirming and validating the connec-
tion between gender and negotiation ability, women viti-
ated the negative stereotype by reacting against it. More
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specifically, women who were told that it is men who have
the upper hand at the bargaining table identified with
counterstereotypic traits and set higher and more
aggressive goals. The ability to marshal empowering
cognitions in the face of what might seem to be the worst
performance conditions is all the more surprising given
that under most conditions, men do outperform women
at the bargaining table (Kray et al., 2001; Stuhlmacher &
Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998).
Kray et al. (2001) suggested that it is the explicit
endorsement of negative gender stereotypes and the
subsequent reactance against this proclamation that
leads women to outperform men. Indeed, when the
endorsement was implicit, men reaped better outcomes
than did women. An important question that we address
in more detail in this article is how the explicit activation
of gender stereotypes affects performance. The findings
from Kray et al. (2001) suggest that explicitly activating
the masculine stereotype in mixed-gender negotiations
prompts negotiators to assess their strengths and weak-
nesses and, in so doing, become more focused on their
relative power within the negotiation context. More gen-
erally, we propose that negotiators attend more to the
content of an activated stereotype when it is explicitly
linked to gender, resulting in a concomitant increase in
the display of the stereotypical traits positively associated
with performance, compared to when the connection
between gender and performance is left implicit. For the
negotiator disadvantaged by the stereotype this involves
acting in a counterstereotypic manner. The mention of
gender serves as a trigger that guides subsequent behav-
ior. Therefore, when the masculine stereotype is explic-
itly activated, negotiators should become more aggres-
sive, contentious, and focused on claiming resources.
But when the feminine stereotype is explicitly activated,
negotiators should become more cooperative and
focused on creating resources.
To test these hypotheses, we varied whether a gender
stereotype was activated implicitly versus explicitly
within mixed-gender dyads in two experiments. We also
manipulated the power distribution within the dyads,
varying whether the male or the female negotiator had
the power advantage. If the content of an activated ste-
reotype matters, then the extent to which power is exer-
cised at the bargaining table should vary after the
explicit connection of a masculine stereotype compared
to a feminine stereotype. In Experiment 1, we varied the
manner in which stereotypically masculine traits were
linked to negotiation effectiveness and measured the
extent to which outcomes mirrored power asymmetries,
a gauge of stereotypically masculine behavior. In Experi-
ment 2, we varied the manner in which stereotypically
feminine traits were linked to negotiation effectiveness
and measured the extent to which negotiators con-
structed integrative agreements, a gauge of
stereotypically feminine behavior. Another advantage of
introducing a power asymmetry to the bargaining table
is that it allowed us to explore the limits of stereotype
reactance, which we describe in greater detail below.
Stereotype Threat Versus Stereotype Reactance
Stereotype threat describes the concern a person feels
about confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative ste-
reotype about one’s group (Steele, 1997). This threat
becomes reality because concern over confirming the
stereotype produces anxiety, lowers expectations, and
reduces performance; thus, it unwittingly confirms the
stereotype (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele &
Aronson, 1995). Kray and colleagues found that simply
describing a negotiation as diagnostic of ability was
enough to produce a male advantage at the bargaining
table.
Because many of the traits associated with effective
negotiators are stereotypically masculine in nature (Kray
et al., 2001), subtly activating the masculine stereotype
tends to lead to outcomes that confirm the stereotype of
male dominance at the bargaining table; that is, when
people are told that effective negotiators are rational,
assertive, unemotional, and have a high regard for their
own interests (stereotypically masculine traits), male
negotiators have an advantage over female negotiators
(Kray et al., 2001). Despite the fact that gender was not
mentioned in connection with these traits, the resulting
difference in aspirations, opening offers, and profits
across gender was significant.
The male advantage can be reversed when men and
women are told that stereotypically feminine traits are
important determinants of negotiation success. Pro-
claiming that effective negotiators “express their
thoughts verbally, have good listening skills, and possess
insight into the other negotiator’s feelings” leads to a
female advantage at the bargaining table. More specifi-
cally, Kray, Galinsky, and Thompson (2002) found that
subtly linking these stereotypically feminine traits with
effective negotiating led women to have higher aspira-
tions, make more aggressive opening offers, and negoti-
ate more profitable agreements for themselves than did
men.
These findings suggest that stereotype threat pro-
cesses apply to both men and women in negotiations;
implicitly activating negative stereotypes about one’s
group leads to decrements in performance for the ste-
reotyped group. In general, stereotype threat appears
not to be limited to traditionally disadvantaged groups;
when traits that are stereotypically connected to a tar-
get’s social category are linked to negative performance
expectations in a domain, the target will tend to feel
stereotype threat and confirm the stereotype (see also
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Leyens, Desert, Croizet, & Darcis, 2000; Stone, Lynch,
Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). The above pattern is consis-
tent with assimilation effects, whereby the implicit and
subtle activation of a stereotype tends to lead to behav-
iors that are consistent with the stereotype (Bargh, Chen,
& Burrows, 1996; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). These findings
suggest that the linkage between stereotype activation
and performance depends on the content of the acti-
vated stereotype, that is, whether the activated traits sug-
gest a masculine or feminine advantage.
But stereotype activation does not always lead to the
assimilation effects characteristic of stereotype threat.
Kray et al. (2001) also demonstrated that explicitly and
blatantly acknowledging that the association between
stereotypically masculine traits and effective negotiating
is linked to gender differences can ironically produce a
female advantage at the bargaining table in mixed-
gender dyads. Kray et al. argued that the explicit activa-
tion of the gender stereotype was perceived as a limit to
the female negotiator’s freedom and ability to perform,
thereby invoking stereotype reactance. Kray et al.
defined stereotype reactance as the tendency to behave
in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype. Explicitly
activating a negative stereotype resulted in stereotype
reactance. This finding is consistent with previous
research regarding contrast effects: When a perceiver’s
attention is blatantly drawn to the link between a stereo-
type and a social category, it can produce behaviors that
are inconsistent with the stereotype (for a related discus-
sion of blatant activation and contrast effects, see also
Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Martin, 1986; Strack, Schwarz,
Bless, Kuebler, & Waenke, 1993). It appears that the
manner in which stereotypes are activated determines
whether they create an assimilation effect (stereotype
threat) versus a contrast effect (stereotype reactance),
which suggests that the linkage between stereotype acti-
vation and performance depends on the manner in
which stereotypes are activated.
Building on results from previous research on stereo-
type reactance (Kray et al., 2001), we contend that the
explicit activation of a gender stereotype leads negotia-
tors to engage in behaviors consistent with the content of
the activated positive stereotype. In an effort to avoid
being pigeon-holed, the negotiator disadvantaged by
the stereotype may engage in counterstereotypic behav-
iors. By realizing that the stereotypical perception of
their ability is invalid, negotiators who are the target of a
negative stereotype may adjust their goals and strategies
accordingly. For example, Kray et al. (2001) found that
the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype led
female negotiators to identify with stereotypically mascu-
line (counterstereotypic) traits as their key strengths and
disidentify with stereotypically feminine traits. Further-
more, explicit masculine stereotype activation led
women to set higher aspirations than implicit masculine
stereotype activation (Kray et al., 2001, 2002).1
This finding supports the notion that the explicit acti-
vation of the masculine stereotype focuses attention
toward one’s strengths and power in the negotiation.
Reactance processes likely result from stereotypically dis-
advantaged negotiators’ awareness that the stereotypical
perception of their ability is invalid in the current con-
text, that both negotiators are actually on a level playing
field, or that they themselves hold a power-based advan-
tage. If our understanding of the process through which
reactance occurs is accurate, then it suggests that negoti-
ators should only react when they possess sufficient
power in the situation to stand their ground at the bar-
gaining table. In all of the examinations of stereotype
reactance to date, both negotiators had reasonably
strong alternatives to the negotiation and thus could
leverage their power. However, reactance against the
explicit activation of negative stereotypes may not occur
when negotiators lack power. Manipulating the power
distribution across the bargaining table, or creating a sit-
uation in which the stereotypically disadvantaged negoti-
ation is at a power disadvantage, allows us to test this
hypothesis.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of the current experiment was twofold.
First, we aimed to deepen our understanding of how the
explicit activation of the masculine stereotype affects
negotiation performance. Second, we sought to identify
a boundary condition for stereotype reactance. To
achieve these goals, we created a power asymmetry at the
bargaining table by manipulating the attractiveness of
negotiators’ options apart from the current negotiation.
Although there are various sources of power relevant
to negotiations (French & Raven, 1959), the ability to
walk away is regarded as the key source of bargaining
power (Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2001). On average, the
negotiating party with a better BATNA (best alternative
to a negotiated agreement) reaps more beneficial out-
comes from the negotiation; the strength of a negotia-
tor’s BATNA positively influences aspirations, and the
amount of resources created and claimed at the bargain-
ing table (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett,
1994). Given that we contend that the explicit activation
of gender stereotypes prompts negotiators to examine
their bargaining strengths, it also should lead them to
examine their power by focusing on their BATNA when
it is salient. Therefore, the explicit activation of a mascu-
line stereotype should magnify the relative advantage of
the negotiator with the stronger BATNA compared to
the negotiator with the weaker BATNA. If the female
negotiator who is disadvantaged by the stereotype is also
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at a power disadvantage, then this should limit her ability
to react against the negative stereotype.
To test the above hypotheses, we examined two fac-
tors—the relative power advantage within the dyad and
the manner in which masculine stereotypes were acti-
vated (i.e., explicit vs. implicit). We hypothesized that
the explicit activation of stereotypes would lead negotia-
tors to engage in behaviors consistent with the content of
the activated masculine stereotype. Because
stereotypically masculine behavior at the bargaining
table involves being assertive and focused on one’s own
interests, we predicted that the tone of negotiations
would be more contentious in the explicit activation
condition. For women, this would involve engaging in
counterstereotypic behaviors. With both negotiators
behaving competitively, we expected the explicit activa-
tion of gender stereotypes would lead to more one-sided
outcomes in favor of the high-power negotiator. To
explore how the behavior of negotiators was affected by
the experimental manipulations, we videotaped the
negotiations.
Method
Participants and design. Our participant sample was
composed of 94 undergraduate students in a business
school at a large, southwestern university who partici-
pated in this study in exchange for course credit and the
chance to win a monetary prize based on negotiation
performance.2 To test our hypotheses, we used a 2 × 2 × 2
mixed-model design, with manner of masculine stereo-
type activation (explicit, implicit) and gender power
advantage (female, male) as between-dyad factors and
power (high, low) as a within-dyad factor. The task con-
sisted of a negotiation of an employment contract
between a recruiter and a job candidate. Role assign-
ments (female recruiter/male candidate vs. female can-
didate/male recruiter) were counterbalanced. Because
no differences were observed for any of the dependent
variables across role assignments, we collapsed across
this variable. Dependent measures included both nego-
tiation outcome and negotiation process measures.
Procedure. Negotiators were randomly assigned to a
mixed-gender dyad and to a negotiator role. Each dyad
negotiated in a private room. All participants were
informed of the importance of negotiations to everyday
life and that their performance on the task would be
diagnostic of future negotiation success. The experi-
menter read the general instructions to participants,
which indicated that the goal of each negotiator was to
earn as many points as possible in the negotiation. Sev-
eral monetary prizes were offered to provide a perfor-
mance incentive. Participants were given private role
information that indicated their preferences in the
negotiation. After reading their role instructions,
negotiators completed a prenegotiation questionnaire
that included measures of the negotiator’s goal and res-
ervation price. On 5-point scales, participants also indi-
cated their perceived power based on their role and
their BATNA (ranging from very powerless to very powerful)
and the attractiveness of their BATNA (ranging from very
unattractive to very attractive). Upon completion, the
video camera was turned on and the negotiators were
given up to 30 min to negotiate.
Negotiation task. The negotiation task was the New
Recruit simulation (Neale, 1997). The task consisted of
an employment negotiation in which a job candidate
and a recruiter had to settle on several issues relevant to
both parties (i.e., salary, benefits). The negotiation
included eight issues in total. Preferences were induced
by assigning points to issues and instructing participants
to achieve as many points as possible. Negotiators could
earn between –8,400 and 13,200 points. Two issues were
purely distributive, meaning that the parties’ prefer-
ences were in complete opposition. Two issues were
compatible (i.e., the parties’ preferences were identi-
cal). The remaining issues formed two pairs of issues
with integrative potential, meaning that one party cared
more about issue A and the other party more about issue
B. If both parties conceded on the issue they cared less
about, they both could benefit and reach the maximum
number of points.
Masculine stereotype activation manipulation. As part of
the general instructions, the experimenter informed
participants in all conditions,
As researchers, we are interested in examining the vari-
ous personal factors that affect people’s ability to per-
form in important negotiations. For example, previous
research has shown that the most effective negotiators in
negotiations like the one that you’ll do today are rational
and assertive and demonstrate a regard for their own
interest throughout the negotiation, rather than being
emotional and passive.
Participants in the explicit activation condition were fur-
ther told, “Because these personality characteristics tend
to vary across gender, male and female students have
been shown to differ in their performance on this task.”
Power manipulation. The manipulation of power
advantage occurred through an “urgent message”
attached to the negotiators’ private role information.
The high-power negotiator had a message that stated
that another party (i.e., employer or candidate) was will-
ing to settle on a contract worth 4,500 points and that
therefore the negotiator can “rest assured now that you
can always achieve an agreement worth 4,500 points.”
The alternative offer was described as “quite favorable.”
The low-power negotiator was told that another party
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was willing to settle on a contract worth 2,200 points,
which was described as “not favorable.” Both negotiators
were informed that the average agreement was worth
3,000 points. To manipulate gender power advantage,
half of the dyads were composed of women in the high-
power role and men in the low-power role and the other
half of dyads were composed of women in the low-power
role and men in the high-power role.
Dependent measures. The primary outcome measure
was the number of points the negotiators achieved (i.e.,
their pay-offs). Although we did not have any specific
hypotheses about whether our experimental manipula-
tions would affect the integrativeness of the negotiation,
we also examined joint pay-off, or the sum of the two
negotiators’ pay-offs. Joint pay-off represents the degree
to which negotiators logrolled (Froman & Cohen,
1970), or traded off issues to capitalize on different
strengths of preferences and the degree to which negoti-
ators identified compatible issues.
The purpose of the video-coding was to examine how
power and stereotype activation affected the negotiation
process. Two different judges reported their overall
impressions of the negotiation and the negotiators. This
type of coding was meant to capture both verbal and
nonverbal communication between negotiators (Porter
& Geis, 1981). Ratings were made for the first half and
the second half of the negotiation separately. Correla-
tions between the ratings for the two halves of the negoti-
ation were generally high (average r = .72); we therefore
averaged across periods. The interrater reliability was
also high (Cronbach’s α = .85) so analyses were con-
ducted on the average scores of the two coders. Judges
were blind to our hypotheses and manipulations. To
avoid cueing judges to gender differences, they were
instructed to rate the behavior of the recruiter and can-
didate roles, not of male and female negotiators. The
overall negotiation was rated as to the extent that it was
contentious and cooperative. For example, a coopera-
tive negotiation was one in which negotiators made
explicit references to compromise regarding an issue. In
contrast, a contentious negotiation was one in which the
same issue would be dealt with by threatening to resort to
one’s BATNA or accusing the other negotiator of being
uncompromising. Judges also coded whether negotia-
tors made reference to their BATNA and, if so, how
often. Negotiators were evaluated in the extent to which
they exhibited the following stereotypically masculine
traits: assertive, passive (reverse scored), controlling of
the negotiation, and powerful. All ratings were made on
a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 = not at all characteristic to
7 = extremely characteristic). Finally, we recorded the length
of the negotiation as a gauge of its difficulty.
Results
Manipulation checks. Consistent with our expectation
that the manipulation of BATNAs would affect percep-
tions of power, high-power negotiators regarded their
BATNA as more attractive (M = 3.52, SD = .96) than did
low-power negotiators (M = 2.24, SD = .93), t(48) = 4.79, p <
.001. High-power negotiators also believed they derived
more power from their BATNA (M = 4.12, SD = .44) than
did low-power negotiators (M = 3.24, SD = 1.05), t(48) =
3.86, p < .001. As a result, high-power negotiators set
higher reservation prices (M = 4,930, SD = 1,151) than
did low-power negotiators (M = 3,672, SD = 1,953), t(48) =
2.78, p < .01. High-power negotiators perceived a greater
advantage through their role (M = 3.92, SD = .64) than
did low-power negotiators (M = 3.40, SD = .87), t(48) =
2.41, p < .05. Role assignment, however, did not affect
perceptions of power, F < 1.
To determine the salience of the power asymmetry, we
also coded whether negotiators made reference to their
BATNA during the negotiation. Overall, 84% (n = 50) of
negotiators mentioned their BATNA at least once dur-
ing the negotiation, and this frequency did not differ by
experimental condition. In sum, our manipulation of
power based on each negotiator’s alternative to the cur-
rent negotiation was successful.
Performance. Because negotiation outcomes depend
on the two parties forming an agreement, the unit of
analysis was the dyad. To compare the relative perfor-
mance of the two negotiators, we conducted a mixed-
model ANOVA of the pay-off score with power as a
within-dyad factor and manner of stereotype activation
and gender power advantage as between-dyad factors
(see Table 1 for average pay-off scores of male and
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TABLE 1: Negotiator Performance by Gender, Masculine Stereotype Activation, and Gender Power Advantage
Female High Power Male High Power
Explicit (N = 6) Implicit (N = 5) Explicit (N = 9) Implicit (N = 5)
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Male 4,200 1,244 4,640 1,894 7,067 1,850 5,700 878
Female 6,017 1,148 5,200 245 3,667 1,083 4,980 950
Joint pay-off 10,217 1,898 9,840 2,017 10,733 1,389 10,680 1,073
female negotiators). Consistent with our expectation
that power would be associated with better performance,
high-power negotiators (M = 6,168, SD = 1,450) per-
formed better than did low-power negotiators (M =
4,252, SD = 1,316), F(1, 21) = 14.47, p < .001, η2 = .41.
Consistent with our hypothesis that the extent to
which the high-power negotiator would outperform the
low-power negotiator would depend on the type of ste-
reotype activation, the main effect for power was quali-
fied by an interaction with manner of stereotype activa-
tion, F(1, 21) = 5.31, p < 05, η2= .20. As shown in Figure 1,
the high-power negotiator outperformed the low-power
negotiator in the explicit activation condition, F(1, 14) =
20.67, p < .001; however, the difference between the
high- and low-power negotiators’ performances was not
statistically significant in the implicit activation condi-
tion, F(1, 9) = 1.70, ns. No other effects emerged as statis-
tically significant.
Joint pay-off. Consistent with previous research, joint
pay-off was assessed by summing the individual outcome
scores of the two negotiators. A two-way ANOVA with
manner of stereotype activation and gender power
advantage as between-dyad factors showed no significant
effects (all Fs ≤ 1.1).
Negotiation process ratings. To examine the tone of the
negotiation, we conducted separate analyses of variance
for each measure with stereotype activation and gender
power advantage as between-dyad factors. Only one
effect emerged as statistically significant. The negotia-
tion was perceived to be more contentious under
explicit stereotype activation (M = 3.75, SD = 1.54) than
under implicit stereotype activation (M = 2.38, SD = .85),
F(1, 20) = 7.37, p < .05. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that explicitly activating gender stereotypes
led negotiators to engage in behaviors consistent with
the content of the masculine stereotype, thereby raising
the level of perceived contentiousness of the
negotiation.
To examine the extent to which negotiators engaged
in stereotypically masculine behaviors, we conducted a
mixed-model ANOVA with power as a within-dyad factor
and stereotype activation and gender power advantage
as between-dyad factors. Before doing so, we formed an
index indicating the extent to which behaviors were
stereotypically masculine by averaging responses to the
following negotiator assessments: assertiveness, reverse-
scored passivity, control of the negotiation, and power.
Reliability of the index was high, α = .95. Consistent with
the hypothesis that the explicit activation of masculine
stereotypes would lead negotiators to act in a manner
consistent with the stereotype, a three-way ANOVA
showed only a significant main effect for stereotype acti-
vation, F(1, 20) = 8.17, p < .01. Negotiators of both sexes
were perceived as more stereotypically masculine after
explicit stereotype activation (M = 5.77, SD = .56) than
after implicit activation (M = 5.14, SD = .60). No other sig-
nificant effects emerged.
Duration of negotiation. We expected negotiations to
take longer when stereotype activation was explicit
rather than implicit, which is consistent with the negotia-
tion process ratings that suggest the level of contentious-
ness was higher after explicit activation. This expecta-
tion was confirmed by a main effect for stereotype
activation, F(1, 19) = 4.88, p < .05. Negotiations took lon-
ger on average after explicit (M = 28 min 28 s, SD = 10
min) than after implicit stereotype activation (M = 19
min 36 s, SD = 7 min 30 s).
References to BATNA. To assess the degree to which the
negotiation was focused on power, we coded the number
of references made by negotiators to their BATNAs. A
significant two-way interaction effect between power and
gender power advantage emerged for this measure, F(1,
21) = 6.01, p < .05, η2 = .23. High-power male negotiators
made reference to their BATNA more often (M = 2.64,
SD = 2.59) than did low-power male negotiators (M = .64,
SD = 1.03), t(23) = 2.42, p < .05, but this difference did not
reach significance for female negotiators (M = 1.73, SD =
1.80 vs. 1.07, SD = 1.59), t(23) = .97, ns. In the female/
low-power condition, men mentioned their BATNA
more frequently than did women (M = 2.64 vs. 1.07),
t(13) = 2.24, p < .05. The opposite was the case in the
female/high-power condition, in which women referred
to their BATNA more often than did men (M = 1.73 vs.
.64), t(10) = 1.83, p < .10.
Discussion
We predicted that the manner in which the masculine
stereotype was activated would affect the use of power. In
addition, we expected that explicitly linking gender to
performance would lead negotiators to engage in behav-
iors consistent with the content of the activated positive
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Figure 1 Experiment 1: Mean performance by masculine stereotype
activation and power asymmetry.
masculine stereotype to a greater degree than when the
connection of gender to performance remained at an
implicit level. Note that for women, this would lead to
behaviors that are inconsistent with the classic female
stereotype and consistent with the classic male stereo-
type. Because the current experiment linked
stereotypically masculine traits to performance, we pre-
dicted that negotiators in the explicit condition would
focus on and leverage their power to a greater extent
than they would when the masculine stereotype was
implicitly activated. With both negotiators focused on
power, we expected women to be ineffective at reacting
against the negative stereotype about their gender when
men had the power advantage over them.
The results of the experiment support our hypothe-
ses. The high-power negotiator obtained more of the
resources when the masculine stereotype was explicitly
activated. The content of the activated stereotype
implies that having a high regard for one’s own interests
and acting assertively are important for negotiation suc-
cess. The pattern of data suggests that both negotiators
in this mixed-gender context exhibited these traits to a
larger degree after explicitly mentioning the relevance
of gender to performance. For women this involved act-
ing in a counterstereotypic fashion. This finding is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that explicit masculine stereo-
type activation leads to more attention to and use of
power in the negotiation than implicit masculine stereo-
type activation.
By using an integrative bargaining task with multiple
issues, the current experiment enabled us to examine
the performance of each negotiator individually. The
results suggest that across the board, both genders
excelled when they were in a position of power. The pat-
tern of data also is consistent with our understanding of
stereotype reactance processes. When masculinity is
explicitly brought to the forefront of negotiators’ minds,
female negotiators react against the negative implica-
tions of the stereotype by increasing their focus on
behaviors that are consistent with the content of the posi-
tive stereotype and counterstereotypic of their gender.
However, reactance only occurs for women when they
have sufficient power through which they can react.
In addition to the evidence garnered by examining
negotiated agreements, the process measures we
obtained also provide support for our hypothesis that
the negotiations would ultimately become more aggres-
sive and contentious after explicit stereotype activation.
First, our coding of negotiators’ verbal exchanges
revealed that high-power negotiators were more likely to
make reference to their BATNA than were low-power
negotiators. Second, judgments of the tone of the nego-
tiation suggest that it became more contentious after the
explicit linkage of gender to negotiation performance
than when the linkage was made on an implicit level.
This finding, in combination with the outcome mea-
sures, is consistent with previous research that has shown
negotiation outcomes tend to be more one-sided as they
become more contentious (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle,
1998). Third, negotiators’ behaviors were perceived to
be more stereotypically masculine after the explicit acti-
vation of the masculine stereotype than the implicit acti-
vation. Finally, reaching an agreement took longer after
the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype, sug-
gesting it was more difficult under this circumstance.
We expected the manner in which stereotypes were
activated to moderate the relationship between power
advantage and performance. More specifically, we
expected the degree to which high-power negotiators
made more references to their BATNA compared to low-
power negotiators to be magnified after explicit stereo-
type activation. Instead, we observed a pattern suggest-
ing that across the board, high-power negotiators made
more references to their BATNA than did low-power
negotiators, without any consideration of the manner in
which stereotypes were activated. Noting the high pro-
portion of the negotiators who referenced their BATNA
at least once suggests that negotiators may have adjusted
their behaviors in the explicit activation condition by
making more extreme demands rather than repeatedly
making mention of their BATNA.
In sum, the findings of the current experiment sup-
port the hypothesis that explicitly mentioning a gender
advantage leads to behaviors that are consistent with the
stereotype of the advantaged gender and
counterstereotypic of the disadvantaged gender.
Because the current experiment connected
stereotypically masculine traits to performance, the
explicit linkage of gender to performance led to more
masculine behaviors. Although these results support our
hypotheses, the current findings do not allow us to
address an important alternative explanation; that is, it is
possible that simply mentioning gender in connection
with performance in a mixed-gender negotiation leads
negotiators to be more competitive. If this is so, then the
content of the stereotype should not matter. To rule out
this alternative explanation, it is necessary to connect
stereotypically feminine traits to performance and show
that it has a differential impact on performance. We con-
ducted Experiment 2 for just this purpose.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 showed that when stereotypically mas-
culine traits are explicitly linked to performance,
women and men who have power use it to their advan-
tage to a greater degree than when the connection
between gender and performance is implicit. This use of
power comes at a disadvantage to the party who is low in
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power. Our fundamental hypothesis is that explicitly acti-
vating stereotypes increases the display of behaviors that
are consistent with the stereotype. In the case of claiming
resources in competitive negotiations, it is masculine ste-
reotypes that are most efficacious. In addition to the
amount of resources claimed at the bargaining table,
another gauge of negotiation success is the amount of
resources created. The results of Experiment 1 showed
that explicitly activating a masculine stereotype, which
seems most relevant to the competitive component of
negotiations, did not affect the creation of resources.
The fact that the explicit connection of masculine
traits to performance in Experiment 1 did not affect
joint profit is not surprising when one considers that, to
reach mutually beneficial, integrative trade-offs in multi-
issue negotiations, a certain degree of cooperation is
necessary (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975); that is, a high degree of
concern for the outcomes of the other party is critical for
formulating integrative agreements (Pruitt & Rubin,
1986). Because the masculine stereotype speaks solely to
a concern for one’s own outcomes and is consistent with
the view that negotiations are a win-lose, competitive
endeavor, the explicit activation of the masculine stereo-
type should not improve integrative outcomes. In con-
trast, the classic feminine stereotype, characterized by
generosity, attending to interpersonal relationships, and
fluid communication, is certainly consistent with the
skills thought to be important for the effective creation
of integrative agreements (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).
What does it mean for an outcome to be integrative
and how does one achieve such integrativeness? An
agreement is considered more integrative than another
one when the integrative agreement makes at least one
negotiator better off and neither of the negotiators
worse off (Thompson, 2001). The construction of inte-
grative agreements typically involves sharing and solicit-
ing information with one’s negotiating partner regard-
ing priorities among issues. Both negotiators can
improve their outcome by conceding on a low-priority
issue in exchange for their most preferred outcome on a
high-priority issue, a technique called logrolling. By
logrolling instead of splitting all of the issues down the
middle, negotiators can expand the pie (Froman &
Cohen, 1970). Because logrolling requires negotiators
to concede on low-priority issues, a certain degree of
cooperativeness is needed.
As described above, we expect the explicit connection
of gender to performance to increase behaviors that are
consistent with the content of the stereotype. More spe-
cifically, we hypothesized that explicitly linking
stereotypically feminine traits to performance should
lead to more cooperative negotiations, resulting in more
integrative outcomes. By demonstrating that the explicit
connection of feminine traits to performance increases
joint pay-offs, we can rule out the alternative hypothesis
that explicitly mentioning gender in mixed-gender
negotiations simply leads to more competitiveness, with-
out regard to the content of the activated stereotype.
Method
Participants and design. Our participant sample was
composed of 68 MBA students in a business school in the
western United States who participated in this study as
part of a classroom exercise.3 To test our hypotheses, we
used a 2× 2× 2 mixed-model design, with manner of fem-
inine stereotype activation (explicit, implicit) and gen-
der power advantage (female, male) as between-dyad
factors and power (high, low) as a within-dyad factor.
Role assignments (female buyer/male seller vs. female
seller/male buyer) were counterbalanced.
Negotiation task. The negotiation task was the Player
simulation (Schroth, 1997). The task consisted of a
negotiation between a motion picture director and pro-
ducer. The two parties had to agree on 11 issues pertain-
ing to the production of a motion picture (i.e., male
lead, director’s salary). As in Experiment 1, preferences
were induced by assigning points to issues and instruct-
ing students to strive to achieve as many points as possi-
ble. In theory, individual negotiators could earn up to
16,200 points and the maximum joint pay-off was 14,000.
Three issues were purely distributive, six issues had inte-
grative potential, and two issues were compatible. The
six issues with integrative potential were constructed so
that the negotiators could concede on a low-priority
issue to get their preferred outcome on a high-priority
issue. Therefore, the size of the negotiating pie, the
amount of resources created at the bargaining table, is a
direct function of how well the negotiators logrolled on
the issues with integrative potential.
Feminine stereotype activation manipulation. Embedded
in the task instructions was the manipulation of stereo-
type activation. Following Kray et al. (2002), negotiators
in all conditions were told,
This negotiation serves as a helpful diagnostic tool for
students to assess their negotiating skills at the begin-
ning of the course. In the past years, this negotiation has
provided a revealing measure of negotiating ability
based on personal bargaining style. As we will discuss
throughout the course, highly skilled negotiators have a
keen ability to express their thoughts verbally, good lis-
tening skills, and insight into the other negotiator’s feel-
ings. Negotiators who display these skills tend to achieve
higher outcomes than those who are unexpressive, poor
listeners, and lack awareness of the other negotiator’s
emotions.
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In the explicit condition only, the following statement
was added to the end of the paragraph, “Because these
personality characteristics tend to vary across gender,
male and female students have been shown to differ in
their performance on this task.” All participants were re-
minded that negotiating effectively is a difficult skill to
master and not all students would achieve the highest
outcome possible.
Power manipulation. As in Experiment 1, we manipu-
lated power through an “urgent message” attached to
the negotiators’ private role information. The high-
power negotiator had a message that stated that another
party (i.e., director or producer) was willing to settle on a
contract worth 6,000 points and that therefore the nego-
tiator can “rest assured now that you can always achieve
an agreement worth 6,000 points.” The alternative offer
was described as “quite favorable.” The low-power nego-
tiator was told that another party was willing to settle on a
contract worth 3,000 points, which was described as “not
favorable.” To manipulate the gender power advantage,
we varied whether the female or the male negotiator
received the high-power role.
Dependent measures. As in Experiment 1, the primary
outcome measures were the scores for the male and
female negotiators and their joint pay-off. The amount
of joint pay-off is a direct function of how well the negoti-
ators logrolled on the issues with integrative potential.
Prior to the negotiation, participants also completed a
questionnaire in which they indicated their BATNA, res-
ervation price, and target.
Results
Manipulation checks. As a check of the efficacy of the
manipulation of power, we asked negotiators to indicate
their BATNA prior to negotiating. Consistent with our
power manipulation, high-power negotiators indicated
a more attractive BATNA (M = 5,804, SD = 798) than did
low-power negotiators (M = 3,103, SD = 557), F(1, 49) =
206.89, p < .001. Likewise, high-power negotiators (M =
6,254, SD = 1,523) set higher reservation prices than did
low-power negotiators (M = 3,977, SD = 1,278), F(1, 49) =
28.11, p < .001. The degree to which negotiator targets
differed across experimental conditions was not statisti-
cally significant.
Performance. To compare the relative performance of
the two negotiators, we conducted a mixed-model
ANOVA of each negotiators’ pay-off scores with power as
a within-dyad factor and manner of stereotype activation
and gender power advantage as between-dyad factors
(see Table 2 for a summary of the means). Consistent
with our expectation that power would be associated
with better performance, high-power negotiators (M =
7,110, SD = 1,008) performed better than did low-power
negotiators (M = 5,076, SD = 1,273), F(1, 27) = 28.14, p <
.001, η2 = .51. However, as predicted, the manner in
which the feminine stereotype was activated did not
qualify this main effect for power. Other than a main
effect for stereotype activation, noted below, no other
statistically significant effects emerged.
Joint pay-off. To analyze joint pay-off, we conducted an
ANOVA, including stereotype activation and power as
between-dyad factors. Consistent with the hypothesis
that the explicit connection of stereotypically feminine
traits with negotiation performance would lead to more
integrative outcomes, joint pay-off was higher in the
explicit activation condition (M = 12,661, SD = 907) than
the implicit activation condition (M = 11,794, SD =
1,294), F(1, 27) = 4.03, p = .05,η2 = .13; that is, the explicit
activation of the female stereotype led negotiators to be
more effective at logrolling those issues with integrative
potential. In fact, by breaking down the joint score into
the three types of issues, it is clear that the stereotype acti-
vation manipulation only affected joint pay-off through
the integrative issues, F(1, 29) = 5.30, p < .05, and not for
distributive issues, F(1, 29) < 1, ns, and compatible issues,
F(1, 29) < 1, ns.
Discussion
This experiment contributes to our understanding of
how the content of stereotypes and the manner in which
they are activated affect agreements. Consistent with our
expectations, explicitly linking stereotypically feminine
traits to negotiation effectiveness in an integrative bar-
gaining task affected the degree to which negotiators
crafted an agreement reflective of the feminine stereo-
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TABLE 2: Negotiator Performance Across Gender, Feminine Stereotype Activation, and Gender Power Advantage
Female High Power Male High Power
Explicit (N = 9) Implicit (N = 9) Explicit (N = 5) Implicit (N = 8)
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Male 5,022 1,469 5,022 927 7,120 719 7,106 1,171
Female 7,611 1,316 6,717 598 5,590 1,440 4,750 1,429
Joint pay-off 12,633 822 11,739 850 12,710 1,056 11,856 1,731
type; that is, negotiators created more integrative agree-
ments after explicit stereotype activation than implicit
stereotype activation. Specifically, explicit activation of
the feminine stereotype led negotiators to be more
effective logrollers, more capable at conceding on low-
priority issues for their preferred outcome on high-
priority issues. Explicit activation of the feminine stereo-
type created resources and expanded the pie. The find-
ings of the current experiment support the hypothesis
that the explicit activation of gender stereotypes leads
negotiators to engage in behaviors that are consistent
with the content of the positive stereotypical traits linked
to negotiator effectiveness.
The current experiment replicated the effect of
power from Experiment 1. On average, the negotiator
with more power was able to claim more resources at the
bargaining table than the negotiator with less power.
Although Experiment 1 observed an interaction
between power and manner of stereotype activation, this
pattern of data did not emerge in the current experi-
ment. Instead, we observed a significant effect of stereo-
type activation on joint pay-off. A comparison across
experiments suggests that the content of the stereotype
determines its impact at the bargaining table. Whereas
explicitly linking stereotypically masculine traits to per-
formance led to greater competitiveness in Experiment
1, explicitly linking stereotypically feminine traits to per-
formance led to greater cooperativeness in the current
experiment.
An interesting question that arises from an examina-
tion of the means in Table 2 is whether men and women
were differentially affected by the manner in which the
feminine stereotype was activated. The pattern of means
suggests that women’s point totals varied depending on
how the stereotype was activated, whereas men’s point
totals were relatively stable across conditions. Although
the inferential statistics do not support the reliability of
this proposition, the experiment clearly suffers from
low-power. As a result, the question of whether the
greater joint gain in the explicit activation condition
resulted solely from the behavior of women as opposed
to both women and men is open. With the current data,
it is impossible to determine whether women were both
more proactive in creating and claiming value in the
explicit condition. To address this question, future
research will need to involve an analysis of the negotia-
tion process, not unlike what we conducted in Experi-
ment 1.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current set of experiments was to
gain a deeper understanding of how the explicit linkage
of gender to performance affects negotiating behavior.
The current experiments suggest that performance is
intimately linked to the content of gender stereotypes
and the manner in which they are activated. Of impor-
tance for understanding gender differences in negotia-
tions as a situational phenomenon, this research shows
that both men and women are sensitive to the content of
an activated stereotype and adjust their behaviors
accordingly.
We hypothesized that the explicit activation of gender
stereotypes leads negotiators to engage in behaviors con-
sistent with the content of the activated positive stereo-
type; for the disadvantaged negotiator, this leads to
counterstereotypic behaviors. Because focusing on
power is stereotypically masculine, we expected agree-
ments to reflect a greater power struggle after the
explicit activation of masculine stereotypes. Consistent
with this hypothesis, the explicit activation of masculine
stereotypes led to more one-sided outcomes in favor of
the high-power negotiator (Experiment 1). This was true
for men and women alike. When the traits that were
linked to effective negotiations were stereotypically femi-
nine, evidence of a heightened power struggle after
explicitly mentioning gender was absent. Instead, nego-
tiators seemed to act in accordance with the feminine
stereotype and behaved more cooperatively, with the
explicit activation of feminine stereotypes leading to
higher joint pay-offs (Experiment 2). In total, this set of
results suggests that the manner in which stereotypes are
activated affects the salience of viable alternatives to the
current negotiation and the degree to which those alter-
natives determine the division of resources.
This research advances our understanding of the pro-
cess through which stereotype reactance works. Kray
et al. (2001) defined stereotype reactance as the ten-
dency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereo-
type. This definition suggests that when the stereotype is
explicitly activated, the negotiator subjected to the limit-
ing stereotype will engage in counterstereotypic behav-
iors. We found evidence of this process across two experi-
ments. Because the content of the masculine stereotype
is related to aggressiveness, concern with one’s own
interests, and overall competitiveness, to react against
the stereotype is to claim and secure a profitable division
of the pie. In contrast, the feminine stereotype includes
attributes related to insight and concern for the other
side, such that reacting against the stereotype involves
creating and expanding the pie.
By manipulating the relative power of the negotiators,
we also investigated the limits of stereotype reactance. In
both experiments, a power asymmetry was made salient
and negotiators with more power claimed the lion’s
share of resources for themselves. Power is indeed a cru-
cial predictor of negotiated outcomes. In the first experi-
ment, however, when the masculine stereotype was
explicitly activated, low-power women did not reverse
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the gender gap and achieve superior outcomes. This
finding suggests that reacting against the masculine ste-
reotype and achieving an advantage at the distributive
bargaining table only occurs when the stereotypically
disadvantaged negotiator is not also crippled by tangible
power deficiencies. Although necessary for overcoming
power deficiencies, engaging in counterstereotypic
behaviors does not appear to be sufficient for reversing
the gender gap.
Thus, the explicit activation of stereotypes does not
automatically lead to a reversal of the gender gap in
negotiations (Kray et al., 2001) but does so only in con-
texts in which the stereotyped negotiator possesses some
initial power and leverage in the negotiation. Blatantly
telling women that they lack the attributes necessary to
prevail at the distributive bargaining table produces ste-
reotype threat in the absence of power and stereotype
reactance when sufficient power is possessed. On a prac-
tical note, these findings suggest that an effective way of
circumventing the negative consequences of stereotypes
is to increase more objective sources of power. If the
power of the stereotyped person is weak, an explicit con-
frontation with the stereotype is even more threatening
and results in greater performance decrements than the
implicit activation of the stereotype. Female stereotype
threat can only become stereotype reactance when suffi-
cient power is possessed.
Our understanding of performance differences as
resulting from contextual factors is consistent with previ-
ous theorizing regarding stereotype threat. Work on ste-
reotype threat suggests that differences between social
groups in stereotype-relevant performance domains are
not the product of inherent, invariant deficiencies of a
group but that underperformance by stereotyped
groups is a situational phenomenon. When individuals
fear that their performance may confirm a negative ste-
reotype about their social group, they tend to live down
to the negative expectations and show performance dec-
rements. These effects can occur for men (Kray et al.,
2002; Leyens et al., 2000) and women (Kray et al., 2001,
2002; Spencer et al., 1999); for Caucasians (Aronson
et al., 1999; Stone et al., 1999), African Americans
(Steele & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1999), Latinos
(Gonzales, Blanton, & Williams, 2002), and Asians
(Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000); and even for social
class (Croizet & Claire, 1998). These findings demon-
strate clearly that stereotype threat is not limited to one
stereotyped group but occurs whenever negative perfor-
mance expectations exist for a social group that are
based on the possession of stereotypical traits.
This research also enriches our understanding of how
power affects negotiation agreements. How negotiators
responded to the salient power asymmetry that existed
in both experiments depended on the manner in which
stereotypical traits were linked to performance. We have
argued that the explicit activation of stereotypes
increases behaviors that are consistent with the positive
traits linked to performance. Depending on the content
of the stereotype, power asymmetries were either
emphasized or deemphasized in the negotiation. When
masculine traits were explicitly linked to performance,
the negotiation process became more competitive and
the negotiator with the power advantage prevailed to a
larger extent than when masculinity was implicitly con-
nected to performance. When feminine traits were
explicitly linked to performance, power asymmetries
were not emphasized; instead, agreements became
more integrative in comparison to when femininity was
only implicitly linked to performance. In total, this
research suggests that the degree to which power is
attended to and exercised depends on the negotiation
context.
Limitations and Future Directions
We have shown that when negotiators possess suffi-
cient external resources, in the form of attractive alterna-
tives to a negotiation, they will be able to react against the
constraints of negative stereotypes. Across both experi-
ments, the division of resources was driven by the relative
attractiveness of negotiators’ BATNAs rather than the
relative advantage implied by the stereotype. Future
research should explore whether there are psychologi-
cal resources, such as self-esteem or self-affirmation
(Steele, 1988; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), that can
increase the likelihood that the blatant activation of ste-
reotypes will lead to stereotype reactance. Only when ste-
reotypes are explicitly activated and when the stereo-
typed individual possesses sufficient resources, physical
or psychological, with which to react is stereotype
reactance expected to occur.
Although stereotype reactance is not specific to one
social group, it has only been demonstrated within the
context of negotiations. Future research should explore
whether explicitly telling someone that their social
group will prevent them from attaining greatness will
ironically lead them to strive for and achieve excellence
in other performance domains and with other stereo-
types. Because we define stereotype reactance (see Kray
et al., 2001) as the tendency to behave in a manner
inconsistent with a stereotype, it may not always be possi-
ble for a person affected by a negative stereotype to
engage in counterstereotypic ways. Behavior in negotia-
tions is somewhat malleable (deciding to be more asser-
tive is something that most people can do) and
counterstereotypic behaviors have real consequences on
negotiated outcomes. In contrast, it is not clear that per-
formance in intellectual (Steele & Aronson, 1995),
quantitative (Spencer et al., 1999), or athletic (Stone
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et al., 1999) tasks, domains in which stereotype threat
has been implicated, is similarly malleable. Thinking
quantitatively or jumping higher may not be so easily
accomplished. The domain of performance might well
be another limit to stereotype reactance.
It also should be noted that our manipulations of ste-
reotype threat and reactance in the domain of nego-
tiation specify the traits (and hence the behaviors) nec-
essary to succeed at the bargaining table. Indeed, we
selected specific masculine traits (Kray et al., 2001) and
feminine traits (Kray et al., 2002) that are actually con-
nected to negotiator effectiveness (Raiffa, 1982). In
doing so, we specified how negotiators could react. Per-
haps explicitly specifying counterstereotypic behaviors
in these other performance domains (e.g., related to
intellectual and athletic ability) would enable reactance
to take place. Until such effects have been demon-
strated, a tentative conclusion to draw is that the stereo-
type threat process is more ubiquitous and common
than stereotype reactance.
Because the content of the masculine stereotype is
related to distributive tactics and dividing the pie, power
moderated the ability to react against that stereotype
when it was explicitly activated. However, because the
content of the feminine stereotype is related to
integrativeness and the ability to expand the pie, power
does not appear to moderate the effect of manner of ste-
reotype activation (i.e., implicit vs. explicit) on perfor-
mance. Future research should explore possible moder-
ators of the ability of men to react against their limiting
stereotype, to look at what limits men from acting in
counterstereotypic ways following explicit stereotype
activation. For example, accountability to constituents
has been shown to make negotiators more rigid and less
integrative in their bargaining (Carnevale, Pruitt, &
Seilheimer, 1981). It might be the case that men who
are accountable will resist being integrative due to a
fear of appearing weak to their constituents, thereby
confirming the negative stereotype rather than reacting
against it.
Another direction for future research is to explore
whether the impact of stereotypes on negotiation perfor-
mance differs depending on the degree to which negoti-
ators identify with the domain. Indeed, stereotype threat
processes have been shown to be larger for participants
identified with the performance domain (for a meta-
analysis of this effect, see Walton & Cohen, 2003). Simi-
larly, one could expect that reactance would be more
likely to occur in people who strongly identify with the
negotiation domain compared to people who do not
regard negotiating ability to be highly self-relevant. By
measuring domain-identification prior to the manipula-
tion of stereotype activation, this hypothesis regarding a
potential boundary condition could be tested.
Conclusions
Across two experiments, we have demonstrated both
the pervasiveness and limits of stereotype reactance. Ste-
reotype reactance can occur for both sexes at the bar-
gaining table. However, whether stereotype reactance
occurs will depend on the power and available resources
possessed by the stereotyped negotiator. Although a gen-
der gap has been documented in negotiations
(Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), our research approach
focuses on properties of the negotiation that are not
inherent to the individual negotiator. We show an inter-
action between the person, whether it be a male or
female negotiator, and the situation, as determined by
the relative power and set of cognitions that each negoti-
ator brings to the bargaining table. A key message of this
research is that by focusing on improving objective alter-
natives to the current negotiation and harnessing
cognitions that are advantageous to their particular gen-
der, negotiators are able to leverage the negotiation to
their advantage.
NOTES
1. A complementary finding was obtained with respect to men, who
were more likely to identify stereotypically feminine traits as their key
negotiating weaknesses after masculine traits had been explicitly
linked to effective negotiating compared to a control condition. Kray
et al. reasoned that the positive stereotype identity bestowed on men in
the explicit activation condition might have created a psychological
burden, a concern about living up to the high standard expected of
them (see also Brown & Josephs, 1999; Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000;
Shih, Ambady, Richeson, Fujita, & Gray, 2002).
2. We excluded from the analyses impasses, situations in which an
agreement could not be reached that was equal or superior to the
BATNAs (best alternatives to a negotiated agreement) of both negotia-
tors, which resulted in a final sample of 50 participants. Impasse rates
were not affected by any of our experimental manipulations. To deter-
mine whether the dyads that were excluded differed from the dyads
that were included in the degree to which they exhibited
stereotypically masculine traits, we compared the process ratings from
the videotapes across groups. The degree to which included and
excluded dyads differed on stereotypically masculine traits was not sta-
tistically significant.
3. Once again, we excluded dyads who impassed from the analyses,
which resulted in a final sample of 64 participants. Impasse rates were
not affected by any of our experimental manipulations.
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